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Abstract
This paper investigates optimal play in coordination games in which cognition plays an
important role. In our game logically omniscient players would be able to identify a distinct
coordination opportunity from other obvious facts. Real players may be unable to make
the required inference. Our main experimental results are that in a coordination task with a
cognitive component (1) players play di®erently when playing against themselves rather than
against another player, and (2) given the opportunity, players signal cognition by choosing
the coordination task over an outside option, a phenomenon which we refer to as cognitive
forward induction.
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1 Introduction
In strategic interactions, cognition ability (how much a player understands the situation) is
important. It is also important to understand what the player believes about the di®erences in
cognition between herself and the other players. That is, even if she has the cognitive ability to
understand the interaction, her behavior may depend on her beliefs regarding the ability of the
other players. To enable us to compare the e®ects of cognitive ability with those of beliefs about
the cognitive ability of others we employ a novel experimental design: We let subjects both play
against themselves and against others. In addition, we explore to what extent experimental
subjects make use of the opportunity to signal their own cognitive ability to others.
In this paper, we use cognition to describe the ability to arrive at new insights from readily
available information. In our experiment, insights take the form of perceiving distinctions among
seemingly identical objects. Cognition in our setting is closely related to computational ability,
or the capacity for logical inference. In our experiment, there is a mathematically precise sense
in which two obvious facts imply a third that is possibly not so obvious. Logically omniscient
players automatically would make the required inference, whereas real players might fail to
realize the implication.
Figure 1
To see what we have in mind, and as a preview of the description of our experiment, consider
the disk in Figure 1. Imagine that two players are asked to simultaneously and independently
1pick one of the ¯ve sectors of the disk. Both receive a positive payo® if they pick identical
sectors, and nothing otherwise.
The way the disk is presented to each player, i.e. front versus back and the degree of rotation,
is subject to randomization: Each of the ¯ve sectors is equally likely to be at the bottom, and
\front" is as likely as \back." At the same time the integrity of the disk, i.e. the relative position
of sectors is preserved. The purpose of randomizing the presentation in this manner is to leave
each player with three e®ective choices: pick a black sector, pick one of the two white sectors
that are adjacent to each other, or pick the white sector that is enclosed by the two black sectors
(henceforth the distinct sector).
Notice that in this game, players are subject to symmetry constraints. For example, the
choice \pick the black sector adjacent to the distinct sector in the clockwise direction," while
available in the language of an individual player, is not part of their common language. The
randomization over the presentation symmetrizes the choices of the two black sectors and of the
two non-distinct white sectors.
Because of these symmetry constraints, players face absence of a common language in which
they could label all ¯ve sectors. Crawford and Haller [1990] and Blume [2000] refer to strategies
that respect such symmetry constraints as attainable strategies. The ¯ve-sector game has mul-
tiple Pareto{ranked equilibria in attainable strategies, e.g. \both players randomize uniformly
over all sectors", or \both players randomize uniformly over all white sectors", or \both players
randomize uniformly over all black sectors" (which we refer to as the black-sector equilibrium),
or \both players pick the distinct sectors" (which we refer to as the distinct-sector equilibrium),
etc. An optimal attainable strategy is optimal among attainable strategies. As long as the
structure of the ¯ve-sector game is common knowledge, the unique optimal attainable strategy
is for both players to pick the distinct sector.
In our game, however, there may be not only absence of a common language for describing
choices but also absence of common knowledge of an available language due to cognitive di®er-
ences. The fact that there is a unique distinct sector is a logical consequence of two other facts,
¯rst that sectors come in two distinct colors, and second that the ¯ve sectors are arranged in
a circular order.1 Even if we take the circular order and the color distinction as self-evident,
players with di®erent cognitive abilities may still come to di®erent conclusions about whether
or not there is a distinct sector. When there are such di®erences in cognitive abilities, there
1Formally the rotational and °ip symmetries of the disc can be expressed through a group (in the mathematical
sense). The symmetries that preserve the color distinction can likewise be expressed through a group. Combining
these two structures corresponds to taking the intersection of the corresponding groups, which then reveals that
there is a unique distinct sector. For details, see Blume [2000] and Blume and Gneezy [2000b].
2will be players who can only describe their available choices with a coarse language, which only
distinguishes between black and white sectors, and others who have access to a ¯ne language,
which in addition di®erentiates the distinct sector.
To analyze the game when there are cognitive di®erences and therefore there is absence of
common knowledge of the structure of the game, we adopt the perspective of variable frame
theory (VFT), Bacharach [1993], expressed in terms of the symmetry constraints on strategies
used by Crawford and Haller [1990] and Blume [2000]. We employ a recursive version of VFT
in which we solve the game by proceeding from lower to higher cognitive levels, at each stage
respecting the symmetry constraints for that level and applying the Pareto principle that was
invoked by Bacharach and underlies the optimal attainable strategies of Crawford and Haller.
We think of players as belonging to two cognitive levels: Low-cognition players are only aware
of the black-white distinction of sectors; their strategies must respect the symmetry of the black
sectors and treat the three white sectors as symmetric. High-cognition players combine the
circular structure with the black-white distinction to infer that the only symmetry constraints
they are facing are symmetry of the two black sectors and symmetry of those two white sectors
that are adjacent to each other; they realize that they have a unique distinct choice. As a result,
high{cognition players have access to a ¯ne language in which to describe their actions, whereas
low{cognition players are limited to a coarse language.
In accordance with VFT, we posit that low-cognition players do not contemplate the possi-
bility of higher cognitive levels. Our recursive rendering of VFT then predicts that low{cognition
players adopt the strategy that would be optimal if all players faced the symmetry constraints
as perceived by low-cognition players; this strategy is to pick one of the black sectors (that
is, low{cognition players use the optimal attainable strategy, given their perceived symmetry
constraints). High-cognition players, in contrast, allow for the possibility that other players are
either high{ or low{cognition players. They adopt a strategy that is optimal given the symmetry
constraints they are facing and given their belief about the proportion of high-cognition player.
If the latter proportion is high, they pick the unique distinct sector; otherwise, they pick a black
sector.2
If there is heterogeneity of beliefs among high-cognition players, then VFT predicts that
some high cognition players will not make use of their insight that there is a distinct sector.
2More generally, we envision the following recursive solution: At the lowest level, L0 players play optimally
given the symmetry constraints they perceive. Higher levels Li form beliefs about the proportions of L0;:::;Li¡1
players in the population, and play optimally given the symmetry constraints they perceive themselves and given
their beliefs about the proportions and play at lower levels. This recursive solution, while in the spirit of VFT,
di®ers from Bacharach's. His solution, translated into our terminology, is a strategy pro¯le that respects the
symmetry constraints at every level and for which there is not another strategy pro¯le respecting the same
constraints that makes players at one of the levels better o®.
3For high-cognition players who believe that they face a high proportion of low-cognition players
it is optimal to pick a black sector. To see whether there is evidence for such behavior, we
employ a novel experimental design: We compare behavior when subjects play the game against
themselves with their behavior when they play against others. VFT suggests that there will be
a higher incidence of choices of the distinct sector in the ¯rst case, the self condition, than in
the latter case, the partner condition.
The strategic consequences of di®erences in object perception and their explanation in terms
of VFT have been experimentally studied before by Bacharach and Bernasconi [1997] (BB).
In their setting objects vary in size, shape and color. As a consequence, in BB the problem
of recognizing a distinguishing characteristic (like relative smallness) is primarily a matter of
whether it comes to mind or not, and not necessarily amenable to logical inference. Loosely
speaking, their focus is on psychological focal points.
Our experiment is also concerned with object perception, except that the attributes that
make one object (sector) distinct can in principle be logically inferred from two other obvious
facts (black{white coloring and the ¯ve-sector circular structure). In that sense we shift the
focus of the analysis in the direction of mathematical focal points. Thus our experiment permits
us to inquire into the strategic consequences of absence of logical omniscience, where agents are
called logically omniscient if they know all the logical consequences of their knowledge.3 An-
other di®erence is that using a multi{sector disk that is symmetric except for color distinctions
eliminates to a large degree the problem of what BB call \nuisance families," i.e. that subjects
construct asymmetries (top/bottom, centrality, proximity) that were not intended by the ex-
perimenter. A third and crucial di®erence in our design is that we let subjects play against
themselves, which permits us to measure their ability to identify the distinct sector, or more
generally to measure what BB refer to as \availability" of an attribute.
Cognitive di®erences have also been studied in the literature on level-k reasoning in games.
In its simplest form level-k theory postulates that there is a hierarchy of player types or levels,
Li, such that Li+1 players play a best response to Li players, starting with an anchoring type L0
whose behavior is exogenously speci¯ed (e.g. uniform randomization over all available actions).
Sometimes, as in VFT, some fraction of equilibrium players are admitted. This approach was
initiated by Nagel [1995] in the the beauty contest (a zero{sum game in which beliefs about
cognition are important) and Stahl and Wilson [1994, 1995]. VFT is a close kin to level-k theory.
3Lipman [1999] relates absence of logical omniscience to framing e®ects. In our case framing e®ects are relevant
for three reasons: First, the existence of a distinct sector must be inferred from other facts; second, di®erent players
may have access to di®erent frames (or symmetry constraints); and third, we manipulate frames by considering
both separated black sectors as in Figure 1 and adjacent black sectors.
4The principal di®erence is in focus. VFT and the present study concentrate on di®erences in
the perceived description of the game as opposed to di®erences in the depth of reasoning about
best responses.
Bacharach and Stahl [2000] develop a boundedly rational version of VFT that has room
for both types of belief hierarchies, those due to di®erences in the perceived description of the
game and and those arising from di®erences in depth of reasoning. Bacharach and Stahl allow
symmetry constraints to vary for the anchoring type, L0. In our setting, this means that there
could be an L0 player who distinguishes only black and white sectors, but also an L0 player
who in addition can identify the distinct sector. The de¯ning characteristic of an L0 player
according to Bacharach and Stahl is that he randomizes uniformly over classes of actions, where
each class consists of actions that are symmetric to each other and is maximal in that respect.
In our game, a coarse{language L0 player would assign probability one{half each to picking a
black sector and picking a white sector. A ¯ne{language L0 player would assign probability
one{third each to picking a black sector, picking the distinct sector, and picking a non{distinct
white sector. Notice that already among L0 players there is a tendency to favor black sectors
and the distinct sector over the other two white sector. In the Bacharach{Stahl setup the details
of L1 behavior are complex, depending on his own symmetry constraints, which can be more or
less severe than those of an L0 player, his beliefs about the symmetry constraints of L0 players
etc. For our purposes it su±ces to allow only one type of L1 player, one who has a ¯ne language,
forms beliefs about the frequency of ¯ne{ versus coarse{language L0 player, and best responds to
those beliefs. Importantly, just as under VFT such an L1 player will pick the distinct sector if he
strongly believes that the L0 player has a ¯ne language and will pick a black sector otherwise.4
VFT, being designed for one-shot games, is silent about the possibility that in a dynamic
setting players may come to have an insight during the course of the game that initially eludes
them. This e®ect potentially contaminates a within-subject comparison of the self condition
and the partner condition. Therefore, while we include a within-subject comparison, we believe
that the real test of VFT is in our between-subject comparison.
VFT is equally silent about the possibility that in a dynamic setting players may try to
make inferences about the cognition of others or signal their own cognition. Nevertheless, if we
follow the basic premise of VFT that there are di®erent cognitive levels and that high{cognition
players reason about the relative frequency of high{ and low{cognition players in the population,
4Belief hierarchies also naturally appear in models with behavioral types. Crawford [2003], for example, has
studied deception in communication games in which fully rational players interact with boundedly rational ones.
Experimental evidence for deception and credulity has been reported in Forsythe, Lundholm and Rietz [1999] and
Blume, DeJong, Kim and Sprinkle [2001].
5VFT suggests the possibility of what we call cognitive forward induction. In standard game
theory, a forward induction argument can sometimes be used to question the stability of a Nash
equilibrium in the game. This occurs, for example, when a player has a deviation from his
equilibrium strategy that leads to a continuation game in which there is a unique equilibrium
that yields him a higher payo® than his status-quo equilibrium payo®. One can then imagine the
player accompanying his deviation by the speech: We both know the payo® I would have received
if I had stuck to my equilibrium strategy. Since you know that I am rational you should infer
that there was a purpose to my deviation and that it must be that I am aiming for the unique
Nash equilibrium in the continuation game that would raise my payo® relative to the status quo.
We set up a similar scenario in our experiment. One player (or possibly both) is given the
choice between an outside option and playing the ¯ve-sector game described above. Payo®s
in the experiment satisfy two requirement: First, the expected outside-option payo® is no less
than the expected payo® from the black-sector equilibrium in the ¯ve-sector game. Second the
payo® from the distinct-sector equilibrium exceeds the expected payo® from the outside option.
A high-cognition player may then consider choosing the ¯ve-sector game and hope to have his
choice interpreted as in the following speech: We both know the payo® I would have received
if I had taken the outside option. Since you know that I am rational you should infer that
there was a purpose to my choice and that it must be to convince you that I understand that we
have a unique distinct choice and that if both of us make that choice I would raise my payo®
above the outside{option payo®. According to this reasoning, we would then expect that players
choosing to play the ¯ve-sector game are more likely to pick the distinct sector than players
in our partner condition. Furthermore, we should expect that players who are told that their
parter had a choice of which game to play show a higher incidence of distinct sector choices than
players under the baseline partner condition.
Our main experimental results provide some support for these predictions. We ¯nd evidence
that (1) in the ¯ve-sector game players may fail to coordinate with themselves, (2) in the ¯ve-
sector game players play di®erently when playing against themselves rather than against another
player, (3) given the opportunity, players will signal cognition by choosing the ¯ve sector game
over an outside option, and (4) players who are conscripted by other players into playing the
¯ve-sector game are more likely to pick the distinct sector than players in the ¯ve-sector baseline
game (where there is no choice).
The inability of some players to solve the game when playing against themselves suggests
there are indeed cognitive di®erence with respect to the experimental task. The di®erence in
behavior when playing against another player suggests that the coordination failures we observe
6are as much a consequence of a failure of common knowledge of cognition as they are a failure of
cognition itself. Cognitively more astute players appear to be aware of di®erences in cognition.
Signaling of cognition provides further evidence that high cognition players believe that other
high cognition players form beliefs about cognition.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the experimental design. In
Section 3 we discuss predictions for our games that are inspired by VFT. In section 4 we report
and discuss the experimental results. Section 5 discusses the literature and Section 6 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
In each of our experimental sessions participants made choices on a pie chart that was divided
into ¯ve sectors of equal size, two of which were black and three of which were white. We
considered two con¯gurations of the pie charts. In one, the two black sectors where separated
from each other, as in Figure 1, and in the other they were adjacent to each other. In either
case there is a unique distinct sector; when the two black sectors are separated from each other
it is the white sector that is enclosed by the two black sectors, when the two black sectors are
adjacent to each other it is the white sector that is opposite from the two black sectors.
We had eight experimental sessions. Each session was conducted with a di®erent cohort of
participants. Each of the ¯rst ¯ve cohorts had 30 members, the sixth cohort had 100 members,
the seventh had 154 members and and the eighth had 160 members. In our ¯rst ¯ve sessions
we compared how subjects played against themselves with how they played against others. In
these sessions we also varied the con¯guration of black sectors. These ¯ve sessions correspond
to four basic treatments, and a variation of one of the basic treatments. The sixth, seventh
and eighth session correspond to distinct forward induction treatments, in which we let (some)
subjects choose which game to play. We ¯rst describe the procedure for the base game that was
implemented in the Partner-Separated Session, in which the two black sectors were separated by
a white sector as shown in Figure 1, each subject was randomly matched with another subject,
and there was no choice of games. Then we will describe how the other treatments di®ered.
We invited students into a room and gave each a registration number. The students then
received written instructions, which were read aloud to make them common knowledge. They
were told that only the investigator would know the identity of the person with whom they were
matched.
A pie chart, consisting of a separate front and back, with ¯ve equal-sized sectors, three white,
two black, and the black sectors separated (as in Figure 1) was then shown to the subjects.
The back and front of the pie chart looked identical. They were glued together to leave space for
7marking choices. Each participant was asked to choose a sector. Using a sticker, we then marked
this choice on the inside, invisible from either side. With probability one-half, the investigator
turned over the chart, exchanging front and back. The matched participant was then asked
(without knowing the choice of his counterpart) to choose a sector. Participants were told that
if the sectors chosen matched, each would receive a positive payo®, and otherwise nothing. The
whole procedure was then repeated in a second stage, without revealing the outcome from the
¯rst stage.
The two-by-two design for the ¯rst four treatments is described in Table I.
Table I
Two-by-Two Experimental Design
Separated black sectors Adjacent black sectors
Partner Partner{Separated Partner{Adjacent
Self Self{Separated Self{Adjacent
The di®erence between the Partner{Separated treatment, which was described above and
the Partner{Adjacent treatment concerns the con¯guration of the black sectors. In the Partner{
Adjacent treatment, the two black sectors are adjacent to each other. The Self{Separated and
the Self{Adjacent treatment were the same as the other two treatments, except that participants
were matched with themselves: Participants made two choices. In stage one each participant
was asked to choose one of the ¯ve sectors. The experimenter recorded that choice with a sticker
between the two layers of the disk. The disk was then randomly rotated and randomly °ipped
before being presented again to the same participant. In stage two each participant was again
asked to choose one of the ¯ve sectors on the disk.
We ran two variations of the Partner{Separated treatment, one in which everyone played
against a partner twice, without feedback, and one in which everyone ¯rst played against a
partner twice and then against him- or herself, again without feedback between stages. Also
the Self{Separated treatment was succeeded by a single stage of play against a partner, without
prior feedback. The Partner{Adjacent treatment involved three repetitions of play against a
partner, without feedback between stages. The Self{Adjacent treatment consisted of two stages
of playing against oneself followed by one stage of playing against a partner, once more without
feedback between stages.
8Our last three sessions corresponded to the forward induction (FI) treatments. In Session 6,
all participants were given the choice of either playing a two-sector game, with two white sectors,
or the ¯ve-sector base game with two separated black sectors and three white sectors. Anyone
choosing the two-sector game played the two-sector game. Whoever chose the ¯ve-sector game
played the ¯ve-sector game, provided there was another participant who had made the same
choice. That way ¯ve-sector play was only by choice.
In Session 7 participants were divided into two equal-sized groups of choosers and candidates.
Choosers had the opportunity to decide between playing the ¯ve-sector game (with two separated
black sectors) and an outside option. Each chooser who opted in was matched with one of the
candidates to play the ¯ve-sector game. Candidates who were matched with choosers became
conscripts, who had to play the ¯ve-sector game. The roles of choosers and candidates was
common knowledge. For candidates, we employed the strategy method, that is they had to
specify their choices in the ¯ve-sector game both for the event of being conscripted by their
partner and the event that their parter chose the outside option.
Session 8 was identical to Session 7 except that conscripts did not learn that their partners
had a choice between playing the ¯ve-sector game and an outside option. Choosers were informed
that candidates would not learn of their ability to decide between playing the game and taking the
outside option. Candidates who were not conscripted were matched with other such candidates
to play the ¯ve-sector game.
The ¯rst six sessions were conducted at the Technion. Participants earned 20 Shekels (at
that time 1 Shekel was equivalent to $0.26) for each coordinated choice.5 Sessions 7 and 8 were
run at the University of California{San Diego. In these sessions participants earned $10.00 for
each coordinated choice and the outside option was worth $6.00.
3 Predictions
A natural benchmark with which to compare our experimental data is the prescription that a
social planner who is aware of the players' symmetry constraints would make to them. In the
¯ve-sector game a social planner would solve a constrained optimization problem, maximizing
the joint payo® subject to the symmetry constraints on strategies that are implied by the exper-
imental design. The solution to this problem is to recommend to pick the distinct sector. When
the two black sectors are separated, the distinct sector is the one enclosed by the two black
sector. When the two black sectors are adjacent to each other, the distinct sector is the one
opposite of the two black sectors. Picking the distinct sector is the optimal attainable strategy,
5Translations of the instructions are in the appendix.
9OAS, of Crawford and Haller [1990] and Blume [2000].
While useful as a benchmark, there are reasons to expect that OAS cannot account for all
of our data. One is simply noise in the data and could be easily accommodated. Another is
that prior work suggests that there are systematic deviations from the OAS prediction in similar
games. For example, Blume and Gneezy [2000a] (BG2000) ¯nd that with a nine-sector disk and
two marked sectors, even though there is also a unique distinct sector, it was never chosen by
experimental subjects.
One possible explanation for the results of BG2000 is that experimental subjects are simply
unable to identify the distinct sector. It is also possible, however, that while there are at least
some who identify the distinct sector, they are not su±ciently con¯dent that others identify it as
well. The latter explanation can be formalized by combining OAS reasoning, i.e. optimization
subject to symmetry constraints, with cognitive hierarchies, i.e. allowing players to perceive
symmetry constraints di®erently.
The result is (a generalization of) Bacharach's variable frame theory (VFT).6 For our game
the theory postulates that there is a hierarchy of cognitive types. High-cognition players are
able to identify the distinct sectors; they are only subject to the symmetry constraints (between
the two black sector, and between the two non{distinct white sectors) that the environment
imposes on them. Low{cognition players are subject to additional symmetry constraints; their
strategies must treat all three white sectors as identical.
VFT further postulates that low-cognition players do not contemplate the presence of higher
cognitive levels; they adopt a strategy that is jointly optimal for low{cognition players given
the symmetry constraints they perceive. This strategy is to pick a black sector. High{cognition
players form beliefs about the relative likelihood of low{ and high{cognition players. They adopt
a strategy that is jointly optimal for high{cognition players, given their beliefs. If they believe
that there is a high probability of facing another high-cognition player, they pick the distinct
sector. Otherwise, it is optimal for them to ignore their insight and to pick a black sector.
We will also postulate that there is heterogeneity of these beliefs in the population, and that
the distribution of beliefs has full support on the unit interval. As a result, VFT predicts that
there is a higher incidence of picking the distinct sector, when players play against themselves
6Bacharach's formulation of VFT requires that players' strategy spaces be rede¯ned in terms of \acts." Acts
group together actions that are symmetric according to a player's \frame." Our formulation, using symmetry
constraints rather than \frames," generalizes VFT in a way that easily accommodates properties like adjacency,
centrality etc, does not require us to change player's strategy spaces, and gives us immediate access to the entire
arsenal of group theory to let us express di®erent symmetries. For the game at hand, this means that we have a
simple way of thinking about how the circular structure of the disk interacts with the black-white structure: The
intersection of the corresponding groups formally identi¯es the distinct sector. Casajus [2001] o®ers an alternative
generalization of VFT.
10than when they play against others. This is summarized in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 [Beliefs Matter] The observed fraction of choices of the distinct white sector
when players play against others is less than the observed fraction of choices of the distinct white
sector when they play against themselves.
The hypothesis expresses the idea that high-cognition players, those who manage to identify
the distinct sector, form beliefs about the relative proportions of high{ and low{cognition players
in the population. A word of caution is in order here regarding our ability to measure whether
a given player has high or low cognition. Having a player play against himself may trigger an
insight that switches a player from low to high cognition. There may be an uncertainly princi-
ple at work here in that we cannot measure a player's cognition without altering it. For that
reason, while we provide within-subject comparisons, we believe that the proper way of testing
the Beliefs-Matter hypothesis is via between-subject comparisons. The within-subject com-
parisons then provide a way of evaluating the concern of whether indeed there is an uncertainty
principle (that we cannot simultaneous measure a players cognition and his belief about other
players) at work here.
While VFT was formulated for one-shot games, its spirit straightforwardly extends to dy-
namic settings and raises intriguing questions. Di®erences in cognition may be a®ected by the
history of play, beliefs about cognitive di®erences may change as a function of history, and play-
ers may have an incentive to signal their own cognition. We refer to players trying to signal
cognition as cognitive forward induction. To see whether there is evidence for cognitive forward
induction, we give (some) players a choice between the ¯ve-sector game and an outside option
whose expected payo® is no higher than the payo® from the strategy of picking a black sector
in the in the ¯ve-sector game, and in two of our treatments we make it public knowledge that
such a choice opportunity exists.7 If cognitive{forward induction considerations a®ect behavior,
7In two of our three forward{induction treatments the outside{option payo® is strictly between the payo®s from
the black{sector equilibrium and the distinct{sector equilibrium of the ¯ve{sector game. Under these conditions,
even in the absence of cognitive issues the conventional forward{induction arguments apply: The strategy to
enter the ¯ve{sector game and then to select a black sector is strictly dominated by choosing the outside option.
Similarly, the strategy to enter the ¯ve{sector game and then to pick one of the two non{distinct white sectors is
strictly dominated. Hence, in the absence of cognitive constraints players who ¯nd themselves in the ¯ve{sector
game should infer that their partner must intend to pick the distinct sector. Hence, all players should choose the
¯ve sector game. Once there are cognitive constraints, we get the additional e®ect that coarse{language players
who have a choice between games should choose the outside option, which give them a strictly higher expected
payo® than the highest expected payo® they can hope for in the ¯ve{sector game. Furthermore, even if as in one
of our treatments, the outside option payo® does not exceed but is equal to the black{sector equilibrium payo®,
for a coarse{language player picking the outside option weakly dominates entering the game: His expected payo®
from entering the game is at most equal to his expected payo® from the outside option, but he risks that the
other player does not also pick a black sector. For a coarse{language player the expected payo® when the other
player picks a white sector is at most two thirds of the expected outside option payo®.
11then (at least for some players) choice of the ¯ve{sector game is a signal of intent to pick the
distinct sector and (at least some of the) players who are drafted into playing the ¯ve{sector
game interpret the signal correctly, provided they know that their partners had a choice of which
game to play. Accordingly, our second major hypothesis is the forward induction hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 [Forward Induction]
1. Players who choose the ¯ve-sector game over the outside option are more likely to pick the
distinct sector than players in the ¯ve-sector game when there is no opportunity for choice.
2. Players who are conscripted to play the ¯ve-sector game likewise are more likely to pick
the distinct sector than players in the ¯ve-sector game when there is no opportunity for
choice.
3. The ¯ve sector game is more frequently chosen when the choice opportunity is publicly
known than when only choosers are aware of the choice opportunity.
By choosing the ¯ve sector game, high-cognition players e®ectively send the message \I must
be a high-cognition player because only for high-cognition players is there a possible advantage
from choosing the ¯ve-sector game." Players who observe their partner having chosen the ¯ve{
sector game may be a®ected in one of two ways, depending on their cognitive type. High-
cognition players may infer that their partner is a high-cognition player as well; low-cognition
players, if they pay any attention to the signal at all, may be prompted to reexamine their
perception of the game.
The distinctive characteristic of VFT is that players form beliefs about the cognitive types
of other players and follow equilibrium strategies given their beliefs. By dropping either of these
two components we obtain two natural hypotheses that compete with VFT. One competing hy-
pothesis is that players are naive and believe that others face the same constraints as themselves.
Under this naive hypothesis there would be no di®erence between playing against oneself and
playing against others. High-cognition players would pick the distinct sector and low-cognition
players one of the black sectors. Furthermore, in contrast to our forward{induction hypothesis
the naive hypothesis would predict that players who have been conscripted to play the ¯ve{sector
game by other players behave no di®erently than they would if they simply had to play the game
in an environment without choice of games.
An alternative hypothesis competing with rational VFT results when we drop the equilibrium
component. This gives us a version of level{k theory, in which players at level j in the cognitive
hierarchy, Lj players, best respond to Lj¡1 players. As discussed in the introduction, Bacharach
12and Stahl [2000] propose a boundedly rational version of variable frame theory along these
lines. The predictions of level{k theory depend on the choice of the anchoring type L0: If
we follow Bacharach and Stahl to allow the symmetry constraints to vary for the anchoring
type (as discussed in the introduction), the predictions from boundedly rational VFT do not
substantially di®er from rational VFT. One minor di®erence is that boundedly rational VFT
can readily account for choices of non{distinct white sectors in the data.
In the terminology of Bacharach and Bernasconi [1997], our disk game is a trade{o® game:
There is a tension between the obviousness of the fact that there are fewer black than white
sectors and the uniqueness of the distinct sector. For such games Bacharach and Bernasconi
formulate their trade-o® theorem, which in our game amounts to: \Players who recognize the
distinct sector pick that sector if and only if the probability of others recognizing it exceeds the
frequency of the black sectors. Otherwise they pick a black sector." This makes sense if high{
cognition players have accurate and identical estimates of the frequency of low{cognition players
in the populations. It is more likely, however, that these estimates vary among high{cognition
players. Therefore we suggest testing a weaker Trade-Off Hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 [Trade-Off] If the relative frequency of distinct{sector choices and black{
sector choices varies in the self{condition between two di®erent ¯ve{sector games, it varies in
the same direction in the partner{condition.
To investigate the trade{o® hypothesis, we compare two versions of our ¯ve{sector game. In
one version the two black sectors are separated by the distinct white sector, as in Figure 1;
in the other version the two black sectors are adjacent to each other, which induces a distinct
sector that is opposite to the two black sectors. This comparison was motivated by the hunch
(con¯rmed in the data, as we will see) that participants would ¯nd it more di±cult to identify
the distinct sector, when the black sectors are adjacent to each other.
Recently, there has been increasing interest among economic theorists in modelling decision
problems and games when agents may be unaware of some facts, e.g. Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini
[1998], Fagin and Halpern [1988], Geanakoplos [1989], Modica and Rustichini [1999], Halpern
and R^ ego [2005], Heifetz, Meier and Schipper [2006] and Board and Chung [2007]. The aim of
this literature is to provide a language for incorporating unawareness into models of decisions
and games. Some desiderata for such a language are that it permits one to express beliefs about
awareness and mutual awareness; more recent contributions have also attempted to express
agents' beliefs about (their own) unawareness.
VFT formulates a hypothesis of how players deal with a speci¯c type of unawareness, i.e.
about degrees of symmetry, in a speci¯c class of games, i.e. pure coordination games. From this
13perspective our experiment is designed to create an environment in which we can demonstrate
the existence of unawareness of a fact (the existence of a distinct sector) among a fraction of
subjects and investigate to what degree experimental subjects reason about the unawareness
of others. The principles that guide VFT are similar to the ones used by Heifetz, Meier and
Schipper [2007] in their formulation of Bayesian games with unawareness and their proposal of
an equilibrium concept for such games: They introduce unawareness types, which are ranked by
the richness of the vocabulary with which they can describe the world. This is analogous to our
\coarse language{¯ne language" distinction. An important part of their equilibrium construction
is what they refer to as the \tyranny of the unaware:" awareness types with narrow horizons
do not conceive of awareness types with wider horizons. This corresponds to our assumption
that coarse{language players do not envision players with a ¯ner language, what Bacharach
and Bernasconi refer to as \blinkering" of players. In their words \...because of blinkering,
[Player 1] does not in general have a complete list of [Player 2s] possible types." Equilibria in
the formulation of Heifetz, Meier and Schipper extend from lower to higher levels of awareness,
which is analogous to our recursive construction of equilibrium.
Games with incomplete awareness are also studied by Feinberg [2005]. He is interested in
modelling unawareness of other players' actions, which ¯ts in nicely with our setting in which
coarse{language players fail to recognize that there is a choice of picking the distinct sector.
Note that in our game a player may be unaware of the availability of some of his own actions.
4 Experimental Results
The results from our Partner{Separated treatment are summarized in Figure 2. In this and
the following ¯gures and tables, \d" denotes the choice of the distinct sector, \b" the choice of a
black sector, and \w" the choice of a white sector other than the distinct sector. In Figure 2 we
report frequencies of sequences of choices for the two stages of the Partner-Separated treatment.
Thus, for example bd denotes a sequence in which a subject chose a black sector in the ¯rst
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Figure 2 The Partner{Separated Treatment
The distribution has two modes, one where subjects consistently chose one of the black
sectors, the other where subjects consistently chose the distinct sector. Like in Blume and
Gneezy [2000a], subjects systematically deviate from the full-information OAS prediction that
they pick the distinct sector.
There is a preponderance of d and b choices. Indeed, the frequency of \w" choices appears less
than chance would predict; in the ¯rst stage, we can reject the hypothesis that the probability
of \w" is 2/5 (the p-value is .044); in the second stage, we can reject the same hypothesis (the
p-value is .002).
Figure 2 suggests that there was a fair degree of persistence between stages. In 16 out of 25
cases the subjects repeated their ¯rst-stage choice in the second stage. If choices were random,
we would expect less than 2/5 of the ¯rst-stage choice to be repeated in the second stage. We
can reject the hypothesis of no persistence, p = :003
It is also worth noting that the situation that subjects face in the Partner-Separated treat-
ment is essentially the same as the situation of the 80 candidates in the Forward Induction
treatment with privately known role assignments that we will discuss in detail later. In this
treatment the candidates did not know that choosers could select the game and candidates al-
ways played the ¯ve-sector game. Of the 80 candidates 18 picked the distinct sector and 56
picked one of the black sectors.
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Figure 3 The Self-Separated Treatment
The ¯rst thing to note is that when players play against themselves there is a marked
increase in the choice of the distinct sector. The fraction of d choices in the ¯rst stage of the
Self-Separated treatment is a measure º of the frequency of high-cognition player. Consistent
with our Beliefs Matter hypothesis, the fraction of d choices in the ¯rst stage of the game
with a partner, Á, satis¯es Á < º: The p-value for a test of equality of proportions is p = :06:8
If we combine the data from the ¯rst stage of the Partner-Separated Treatment with those for
the 80 candidates in the Forward Induction treatment with privately known role assignments,
the p{value becomes p = 0:00045: Therefore, we ¯nd strong support for our key hypothesis that
players' choices are not only determined by what they know but also by what they believe.
The second remarkable fact is that after having played against themselves, subjects are
twice as likely to choose the distinct sector, when paired with a partner. Formally, we can reject
the hypothesis that the proportion of distinct sector play is the same with and without prior
play against oneself (p < :001). This is not explained by conventional learning theories since
between rounds there is no feedback on either own payo®s, or the choices of other players. This
observation is consistent with what we referred to as the uncertainty principle that measuring
the fraction of high-cognition players a®ects the measured proportion of distinct sector play.
If prior play against oneself has such a dramatic e®ect on play against a partner, one may
wonder whether the reverse is true as well. It could be that in either case the task becomes
8Here and in similar test below, we use the one-tailed p-value from Fisher's exact test.
16easier by prior exposure to a similar task. However, depending on the task performed ¯rst, it is
also possible that this task creates a frame that adversely a®ects performance in the second task.
To answer this question, we conducted a variation of our ¯rst (Partner-Separated) treatment,
in which we ¯rst let the participants play against a partner and then against themselves. The
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Figure 4 Partner-Separated followed by Self-Separated Treatment
First, note that the results reported for the ¯rst two stages in Figure 4 (against a partner)
are very similar to those reported for the two stages in Figure 2. This con¯rms and strengthens
our results on play against a partner and provides further evidence for our Beliefs Matter
hypothesis. In contrast, the frequency of distinct-sector play in stages 3 and 4 of Figure 4
(against oneself) is slightly lower than in the ¯rst two stages of the self-prominent treatment
(also against oneself) in Figure 3. Most importantly, the frequency of d choices when playing
against oneself after playing against a partner (30 out of 60 in stages 3 and 4 in Figure 4) is
considerably lower than the frequency of d choices when playing against a partner after ¯rst
playing against oneself (24 out of 30). Altogether, prior play against oneself appears to have a
salutary e®ect on subsequent play, whereas prior play against a partner does not have such an
e®ect.
While VFT has been formulated for static settings, it is not di±cult to come up with amend-
ments that would explain the salutary e®ect of playing against oneself for subsequent play against
others. Players on their own are not as likely to \put themselves into the other player's shoes"
17as when they are forced to do so by having to assume both roles. Thus, if they ¯rst play against
themselves they may learn to better to understand the strategic situation and can use the knowl-
edge gained this way in later play against others. Analyzing the game from both perspectives
may lead some individuals to discover that there is a unique distinct sector. In contrast, the
observation that prior play against a partner seemingly adversely a®ects cognition is puzzling
from a VFT perspective. How can it be that any kind of exposure to the game appears to ad-
versely a®ect cognition? Perhaps, when ¯rst playing against a partner, a player may get locked
into a disadvantageous strategy.
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5 The Partner-Adjacent Treatment
In the Partner-Adjacent treatment we observe a marked drop in distinct sector play relative
to the Partner{Separated treatment. Formally, we can reject the hypothesis of equality of
the proportions in the Partner-Separated and Partner-Adjacent treatments (p < :036). In the
Partner-Adjacent treatment the modal choice in the ¯rst stage is to pick a black sector. There
were 18 choices of a black sector in the ¯rst-stage, while we would expect only 12 on average, if
choices were made randomly. Indeed, we can reject the randomness hypothesis, p = :021:
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Figure 6 The Self-Adjacent Treatment
As predicted by our Beliefs Matter hypothesis, the observed fraction of choices of the
distinct sector, Á; in the Partner-Adjacent treatment is less than the fraction of high{cognition
players, º as measured by the self-adjacent treatment, although the di®erence is not statistically
signi¯cant, p = :167: As in the separated-sector treatments, prior play against oneself does seem
to encourage play of the distinct sector, when later paired with a partner, consistent with our
uncertainty principle, although here the evidence is weaker, p = :063.
The adjacent{sector and separated{sector treatments represent two ways of framing essen-
tially identical problems. This permits us to ask how our Trade-Off Hypothesis fares in the
comparison between the two frames. We ¯nd that a smaller fraction of participants picks the
distinct sector in the ¯rst stage of the Self{Adjacent treatment (8 out of 30) than in the ¯rst
stage of the Self{Separated treatment (17 out of 30), p = :0176. Our Trade-Off hypothesis
therefore predicts that a smaller fraction will pick the distinct sector in the Partner{Adjacent
treatment than in the Partner{Separated treatment. Indeed, con¯rming the hypothesis, the
proportions are 4 out of 30 versus 11 out of 30 for the ¯rst stages of the two treatments re-
spectively, p = :0358. Notice that while the naÄ ³ve hypothesis would make the same directional
prediction as our Trade-Off hypothesis, the naÄ ³ve hypothesis also predicts that there is no
di®erence between the self and the partner conditions.
Recall that we evaluate our Forward Induction hypothesis with three di®erent treatments.
In our ¯rst forward-induction treatment all participants are given the choice between playing
19the ¯ve-sector game with separated black sectors or a two-sector game. As shown in Figure 7,
most participants chose the outside option and conditional on choosing the ¯ve{sector game a
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Figure 7 Forward Induction - All Participants Have a Choice
In this treatment, 34 out of 100 participants chose the ¯ve-sector game. 27 out of the 34
proceeded to choose the distinct sector. 5 chose one of the black sectors, and two chose one of
the other white sectors. This implies that there is a marked increase in the percentage of distinct
sector play, when we allow players to select the game rather than have everyone play the game,
p < :001. This is consistent with (the ¯rst part of) our Forward Induction hypothesis.
Giving all participants a choice, and having the expected payo® from the two-sector outside
option be the same as from both players picking the black sector does not result in the cleanest
possible test of our Forward{Induction hypothesis. First, the payo® equivalence may lead some
low-cognition players to choose the ¯ve-sector game. Second, it could be that even under the
naÄ ³ve hypothesis su±ciently optimistic high-cognition players enter the ¯ve-sector game and
then choose the distinct sector, without making inferences about why their partner may have
chosen the ¯ve-sector game.
For that reason we considered a second forward-induction treatment in which di®erent players
are assigned di®erent roles. Some players, choosers, have a choice between an outside option
and playing the ¯ve-sector game. Other players, candidates, only play the ¯ve-sector game if
20they are conscripted by their partner to play. The payo® from the outside option exceeds the
expected payo® from both players picking a black sector in the ¯ve-sector game. This structure,
including the role assignment, is public knowledge. Therefore, we call this treatment Forward-










Outside option Distinct sector Black sector Other white sector











Figure 8 Forward Induction - Publicly Known Role Assignments
24 of the 41 choosers who elected to play the ¯ve-sector game picked the distinct sector
(58.5%). In contrast, only 11 out of 30 (36.6%) participants picked the distinct sector in the ¯rst
stage of the Partner-Separated treatment (p = 0:057); if we combine these data with those from
the 80 candidates in the Forward Induction treatment with privately known role assignments,
where 18 out of 80 candidates chose the distinct sector, the p{value becomes p = 0:0003. These
results lend strong support to the ¯rst component of our Forward Induction hypothesis;
choosers who elect to play the ¯ve-sector game are more likely to pick the distinct sector than
subjects in the ¯ve-sector game without choice.
41 out of 77 candidates picked the distinct sector (53.2%) in contrast to 11 out of 30 in the ¯rst
stage of the Partner-Separated treatment (p = 0:09); if we combine these data with those from
the 80 candidates in the Forward Induction treatment with privately known role assignments,
where 18 out of 80 candidates chose the distinct sector, the p{value becomes p = 0:00008. These
results lend strong support to the second component of our Forward Induction hypothesis;
candidates who know that they are facing players who have a choice of which game to play are
21more likely to pick the distinct sector in the ¯ve-sector game than subjects in the ¯ve-sector
game without choice.
It is also worth noting that there is a remarkably low number of instances in which one of the
non-distinct white sectors was picked in the ¯ve-sector game, 2 out of 41 choosers who elected
to play the ¯ve-sector game and 1 out of 77 candidates. For choosers, a sensible interpretation
is that those who were confused about which action to pick in the ¯ve-sector game most likely
picked the outside option. For candidates, a possible explanation is that there is an aha-e®ect
from contemplating why choosers might want to forego an attractive outside option.
In order to better understand whether choosers were truly motivated by forward-induction
considerations we ran another treatment, in which again some players were given a choice be-
tween an outside option and playing the ¯ve-sector game. Unlike in the case we just discussed
though, this treatment was designed to remove forward-induction consideration by not inform-
ing conscripts that their partner had a choice, while keeping choosers fully informed about the
structure of the game. Therefore we refer to this as the Forward-Induction treatment with
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Figure 9 Forward Induction - Privately Known Role Assignments
Consistent with the third component of our Forward Induction hypothesis, a higher
percentage of choosers selected the outside option in the Forward-Induction treatment with
22privately known role assignments 57.5% (46 out of 80) versus 46.7% (36 out of 77) when role
assignments were publicly known, although the di®erence is not signi¯cant at the 10% level,
p = :117. Conditional on electing to play the ¯ve-sector game, choosers were less likely to pick the
distinct sector, with 35.3% (12 out of 34) picking the distinct sector when role assignments were
private information versus 58.5% (24 of the 41) when role assignments were public information
(p = 0:0377). This suggests that at least some of the choosers in the forward{induction treatment
with publicly known role assignments were guided by forward{induction consideration. At the
same time it shows that a substantial number of players elect to play the ¯ve{sector game even
when there are no signaling opportunities.
5 Related Literature
This paper touches on four areas: Focal points, lack of a common language, lack of common
knowledge and forward induction. In this section, we brie°y review some of the contributions
to these literatures that are relevant for the present paper and were not already discussed.
Focal points were ¯rst investigated by Schelling [23], who provides intuition and reports
results from some informal experiments. According to Schelling the two prime characteristics
of focal points are conspicuousness and uniqueness. He suggests that ¯nding them may depend
more on imagination than on logic. This suggests that Schelling is skeptical of a formal game
theoretical investigation of focal points. In particular, he expresses his reservations about the
\empirical relevance of mathematical foci." According to Schelling, one should not ascribe to
the players in a game the mathematical sophistication of the analyst. For a sophisticated
mathematical solution to be focal for a player, that player needs not only to be a mathematician,
but must also view his/her playing partners as such.
Schelling's distinction between mathematical and psychological foci is potentially relevant
for interpreting the results of our experiment. Essentially, in our games conspicuousness of the
black sectors is a psychological phenomenon and competes with the uniqueness of the distinct
sector, a mathematical fact. We show that mathematical focal points cannot be dismissed.
We demonstrate that the ability to identify mathematical foci varies across the population.
Therefore, in situations were agents can self-select, a subpopulation may achieve critical mass;
i.e. the mathematical focal point becomes conspicuous for a su±ciently large fraction of the
subpopulation for its uniqueness to become decisive.
Sugden [1995] develops a formal theory of focal points by explicitly introducing the labeling
of strategies into the analysis. He aims at a \... general theory of how labels can in°uence
decisions in games" (Sugden [1995], p. 534). In a pure coordination game, his theory prescribes
23that players use decision rules, maps from their private descriptions to a labeled choice, that
induce a distribution over choices that maximizes the coordination probability. He argues that in
environments with a common culture this prescription often leads to a unique optimal decision
rule because of the skewed distribution of the di®erent items mentioned. Our forward{induction
results can be interpreted as saying that, when given the opportunity, agents may self-select into
common cultures that facilitate coordination.
Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden [1994] examine the concept of a focal point experimentally in
pure coordination games. Their objectives are to replicate Schelling's informal experiments, and
to discriminate among alternative explanations for coordination success being more frequent
than accounted for by pure chance. They distinguish among primary, secondary, and Schelling
salience. Primary salience of an action means that (for whatever reason) it is likely to come to
mind. An action has secondary salience if it is the optimal reply to one deemed to have primary
salience for the playing partner(s). An action has Schelling salience if there is a selection rule
that, if used by both players, unambiguously singles out that action as guaranteeing coordina-
tion success. They con¯rm the observation that coordination success is often more frequent than
would be suggested by pure chance, and they reject the explanation that this is due to a com-
bination of primary salience and shared cultural experience. They suggest that both secondary
and Schelling salience play a role.
We use a variant of VFT, that substitutes symmetry constraints for frames and therefore
avoids having to introduce \acts," to organize the data from our experiment. This model is
very much in the spirit of and owes an obvious debt to Bacharach's [1993] original formulation.
There are three di®erences, two minor and one more substantive.
The ¯rst minor di®erence is that our treatment of strategies conforms more closely with the
conventional way of treating Bayesian games. As in the standard approach, our strategies are
functions from private information into actions, conventionally de¯ned. We then let a player's
strategy be subject to symmetry constraints. Bacharach instead replaces actions by \acts" that
already embody symmetry constraints. We feel that it is an advantage of our approach that we
can easily accommodate a richer set of symmetry constraints than those given by partitions.
The second minor di®erence is in the proposed solution. Our solution is based on recursive
optimality. In contrast, Bacharach's solution, translated into our terminology, is a strategy
pro¯le that respects the symmetry constraints at every cognition level and for which there is
not another strategy pro¯le respecting the same constraints that makes players at one of the
levels better o®. Such \admissible variable universe equilibria" need not exist. For example, if
the fraction of high{cognition players in our circle game is su±ciently large, the high{cognition
24players strictly prefer the equilibrium in which they pick the distinct sector and the low{cognition
players randomize over the three white sectors. Alternatively, one could de¯ne an \admissible
variable universe equilibrium" as a strategy pro¯le that respects the symmetry constraints at
every cognition level and for which there is not another strategy pro¯le respecting the same
constraints that makes players at every level better o®. This will ensure existence but with a high
enough probability of high{cognition players in our game will imply multiplicity of equilibria. In
examples, Bacharach looks at solutions that in fact satisfy recursive optimality, which suggests
to us that we are implementing Bacharach's intent.
The substantive extension of Bacharach's approach it to a permit more general structures on
the sets of objects than partitions, or collections of partitions. This allows us to accommodate
the circular structure in our games. In other settings, it would help one to incorporate other
structures, like relative position, temporal order, size, brightness, compositionality, centrality,
adjacency, etc.
Our approach to the players' framing problem is through the language they use to describe
a set of objects. Like Crawford and Haller [1990] we model lack of a common language through
symmetry constraints on players' strategies. Segal [1999] uses symmetry to model language
constraints in a contracting setting. Like Blume [2000] we permit some structure in the language
by permitting symmetry restrictions other than complete symmetry. The variant of VFT used
in the present paper combines Bacharach's representation of lack of common knowledge with
Crawford and Haller [1990] and Blume's [2000] representation of lack of a common language.
An alternative way to generalize Bacharach's model would be to use relational structures as in
Rubinstein [1996].
Common knowledge of di®erences in cognition is sometimtes paradoxical; it would not make
sense in our setting for low{cognition players to know that they to not recognize the distinct sec-
tor as being distinct.9 This suggests paying closer attention to belief hierarchies, as in Bacharach
[1993]. The situation is somewhat analogous to environments in which boundedly rational play-
ers have di®erent depths of reasoning, e.g. some playing naive strategies, some playing best
responses to naive behavior, some best responding to beliefs that assume best responses to
naive play, etc. as in level{k theory.
Forward induction expresses the idea that behavior in a subgame may be in°uenced by
the way in which the subgame was reached. The forward induction idea was introduced by
Kohlberg and Mertens [1996]. They show that stable sets of equilibria have the \forward-
induction property," i.e. they contain a stable set of any game obtained by eliminating \never-
9Of course, it would not be paradoxical for them to know that one of the ¯ve sectors is distinct and that others
may know which one it is.
25weak-best responses." Van Damme [1989] provides an alternative de¯nition of forward induction
based on the extensive form of the game. He argues that strategic stability does not fully capture
the forward induction logic. Some of the forward induction logic is captured by (iterative)
deletion of dominated strategies, e.g. Ben-Porath and Dekel [1992].
The experimental literature has found mixed support for the forward{induction hypothesis.
Consistent with the forward induction hypothesis, Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (CDFR)
[1993] ¯nd that providing one player with an outside option in the Battle of the Sexes game
predominantly leads to play of that player's favorite equilibrium in the BoS subgame. Some-
what at variance with the forward-induction hypothesis, they ¯nd that the outside option in
BoS matters even when it yields a payo® lower than the lowest Nash equilibrium in the BoS
subgame. Moreover, contrary to a strict interpretation of forward{induction reasoning, CDFR
in a coordination game ¯nd a large number of choices of the outside option, when FI would
suggest that the outside option would never be chosen. Cachon and Camerer [1996] suggest,
and provide supporting data, that some observations consistent with backward induction may
instead be due to loss avoidance. Furthermore Camerer and Johnson [2004] provide data that
suggest that, contrary to what would be implied by forward induction reasoning, responders pay
relatively little attention to the choosers' outside{option payo®s. We show that there is a role for
forward induction in strategic environments with heterogeneity in cognition and heterogeneity
of beliefs about cognition.
6 Conclusion
It appears self-evident that di®erences in cognition play an important role in many \real-world"
strategic interactions. As a consequence, even if interests are perfectly aligned, organizations
may not achieve the full bene¯ts of cooperation, and in adversarial settings smarter players may
gain persistent advantages.
The contribution of this paper is in showing that participants in our experiments form beliefs
about each others' cognition and signal their own cognition if given the opportunity. Failure
to coordinate in our strategic environment is shown to result both from failure of cognition
and pessimistic beliefs regarding the cognition of others. We extend VFT as the conceptual
framework for studying the strategic e®ect of cognitive di®erences in pure coordination games
and experimentally show that cognitive di®erences have measurable and predictable e®ects in
these games.
While VFT and cognitive forward{induction do capture some of the central tendencies in our
data, the data also poses come challenges for the theory. Among the more important ones are:
26Why does it seem that prior play against a partner worsens performance when playing against
oneself? Why is there no statistically signi¯cant di®erence between the proportion of distinct{
sector choices in the Partner{Adjacent and Self{Adjacent treatments? Why is the di®erence in
proportions of choosers selecting the outside option between the cases of publicly and privately
known role{assignments not statistically signi¯cant? While it may su±ce to simply have more
data to answer the latter two questions, the ¯rst puzzle may require us to look beyond the
con¯nes of VFT.
In future work along these lines it would also be interesting to investigate how agents, or
groups of agents, can improve their strategic sophistication; whether strategic sophistication in
one domain carries over to other domains; and, how agents deal with similar cognitive tasks in
con°ict situations.
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30Appendix 1: Raw Data
Table II
Partner - Separated
Observation Stage 1 Stage 2 Observation Stage 1 Stage 2
1 d d 16 b b
2 d d 17 b b
3 d d 18 b b
4 d d 19 b b
5 d d 20 b b
6 d d 21 b b
7 d d 22 b b
8 d d 23 b w
9 d b 24 w w
10 d b 25 w w
11 d b 26 w w
12 b d 27 w b
13 b d 28 w b
14 b b 29 w b
15 b b 30 w b
Table III
Self - Separated
Obs. Stage 1 Stage 2 With Partner Obs. Stage 1 Stage 2 With Partner
1 d d d 16 d d d
2 d d d 17 d d d
3 d d d 18 w w d
4 d d d 19 w w d
5 d d d 20 w w d
6 d d d 21 w w d
7 d d d 22 b b d
8 d d d 23 w b d
9 d d d 24 w d d
10 d d d 25 w w w
11 d d d 26 w w w
12 d d d 27 b b w
13 d d d 28 b b b
14 d d d 29 b b b
15 d d d 30 d d bTable IV
Partner{Separated followed by Self{Separated
Obs. Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Obs. Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
Partner Partner Self Self Partner Partner Self Self
1 d d d d 16 b b b b
2 d d d d 17 b b b b
3 d d d d 18 b b b b
4 d d d d 19 b b b b
5 d d d d 20 b b b b
6 d d d d 21 b b b b
7 d d b b 22 b b b b
8 d b d d 23 b b w w
9 d b d d 24 b b w b
10 d b d d 25 w b b b
11 d b d b 26 w d d d
12 d b d b 27 w w b b
13 b b d d 28 w w w w
14 b b d d 29 w w w w
15 b b d d 30 w w d d
Table V
Partner - Adjacent
Obs. Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Obs. Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
1 d d d 16 b b b
2 d d d 17 b b d
3 d b b 18 b b w
4 b d b 19 b b w
5 b b b 20 b w w
6 b b b 21 b w b
7 b b b 22 w b b
8 b b b 23 w b b
9 b b b 24 d b w
10 b b b 25 w b w
11 b b b 26 w w w
12 b b b 27 w w w
13 b b b 28 w w w
14 b b b 29 w w w
15 b b b 30 w d wTable VI
Self - Adjacent
Obs. Stage 1 Stage 2 With Partner Obs. Stage 1 Stage 2 With Partner
1 d d d 16 b b b
2 d d d 17 b b b
3 d d d 18 b b b
4 d d d 19 b b b
5 d d d 20 b b d
6 d d d 21 b b w
7 d d d 22 b b w
8 d d b 23 w w w
9 b b b 24 w w w
10 b b b 25 w w w
11 b b b 26 w w w
12 b b b 27 w w w
13 b b b 28 w w b
14 b b b 29 w w d
15 b b b 30 w w d
Table VII
Forward induction when all participants have a choice
Outside option Distinct sector Black sector Other white sector Total
66 27 5 2 100
Table VIII
Forward induction with publicly known role assignments
Outside option Distinct sector Black sector Other white sector Total
Choosers 36 24 15 2 77
Candidates n/a 45 31 1 77
Table IX
Forward induction with privately known role assignments
Outside option Distinct sector Black sector Other white sector Total
Choosers 46 12 22 0 80
Candidates n/a 18 56 6 80Appendix 2 
Instructions for 
1.  Play against a partner (Translation from Hebrew) 
2.  Play against oneself  (Translation from Hebrew) 
3.  Forward induction where all participants have a choice (Translation from 
Hebrew) 
4.  Forward induction with publicly known role assignments 

























 Instructions  
Welcome to this experiment in decision making. Soon you will be randomly 
matched with another student. The experiment will take about 20 minutes and you 
may earn up to 40 Shekel in it.  
  In the first stage of the experiment one person in each couple will be asked to 




The actual pie will be a two-sided pie, in which the two sides are identical {At 
this point the subjects were given the actual pie chart used in the experiment in order 
to observe it}. 
  We will mark this choice on the inside of the chart. Then we will flip the chart 
randomly, and show it to the other subject. The second subject will not know whether 
(s)he observes the chart from the same side as the first subject or not. (S)he will also 
not see the choice of the first player. We will then ask the second subject also to 
choose one sector out of the five. 
 Payment: Each of the two subjects will be paid 20 shekels if they will choose the 
same sector and nothing otherwise.  
 
We will then repeat this experiment once more in exactly the same way. We 
will not let you know the outcome of the first experiment before choosing in the 
second. At the end of the second experiment the payment for the two experiments will 
be calculated and you will be paid privately and in cash. 
 




















 Instructions  
Welcome to this experiment in decision making. The experiment will take 
about 20 minutes and you may earn up to 60 Shekel in it.  
  In the first stage of the experiment you will be asked to make a simple 
decision: to choose one out of the five sectors of a pie chart similar to this.  
 
 
The actual pie will be a two-sided pie, in which the two sides are identical. 
{At this point the subjects were given the actual pie chart used in the experiment in 
order to observe it}. 
  We will mark this choice on the inside of the chart. Then we will flip the chart 
randomly, and show it to you again. You will not know whether you observe the chart 
from the same side as before or not. We will then ask you to choose again one sector 
out of the five. 
 
Payment: You will be paid 20 Shekel if you  choose the same sector in the two stages 
and nothing otherwise.  
 We will then give you the instructions for the second part of the experiment. 
At the end of the second experiment the payment for the two experiments will be 
calculated and you will be paid privately and in cash. 
 

























 Instructions  
Welcome to this experiment in decision making. The experiment will take 
about 20 minutes and you may earn up to 40 Shekel in it.  








You will be matched with another subject who chose the same object as you 
did.  
If you choose the pie, then one person in each couple will be asked to make a simple 
decision: to choose one out of the five sectors of a pie chart similar to this. The actual 
pie will be a two-sided pie, in which the two sides are identical. {At this point the 
subjects were given the actual pie chart used in the experiment in order to observe it}. 
  We will mark this choice on the inside of the chart. Then we will flip the chart 
randomly, and show it to the other subject. The second subject will not know whether (s)he observes the chart from the same side as the first subject or not. (S)he will also 
not see the choice of the first player. We will then ask the second subject also to 
choose one sector out of the five. 
 
If you choose the rectangle, then the experiment will be done in a similar way but 
with the rectangle. 
 
Payment: Regardless of the object chosen, each of the two subjects will be 
paid 40 Shekel if they choose the same sector and nothing otherwise.  
 
Remark: In case we will have an uneven number of subjects choosing the pie, 
one of them will be chosen randomly to participate in the rectangle experiment. 
  
At the end of the experiment the payment will be calculated and you will be 
paid privately and in cash. 
 








Instructions for Student A 
Welcome to this experiment in decision making. Soon you will be randomly 
matched with another student. You are called Student A and the other student is called Student B. The experiment will take about 15 minutes and you may earn up to 
$10 in it.  
  In the first stage of the experiment you will be asked to make a simple 
decision between the following two options: 
 
Option 1: choose one out of the five sectors of a pie chart similar to this.  
 
 
The actual pie will be a two-sided pie, in which the two sides are identical.  
We will mark this choice on the inside of the chart. Then we will flip the chart 
randomly, and show it to Student B. Student B will not know whether (s)he observes 
the chart from the same side as you or not. (S)he will also not see your choice. We 
will then ask Student B also to choose one sector out of the five. 
 
Payment: Each of you will be paid $10 if you choose the same sector and nothing 
otherwise.  
 
Or, you may choose option 2. Option 2: be paid $6 for participating in the experiment 
 
If you choose option 1, than your payment will depend on both your choices 
as described above. If you choose option 2 then each of you will be paid $6.  
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
 Instructions for Student B 
Welcome to this experiment in decision making. Soon you will be randomly 
matched with another student. You are called Student B and the other student is called 
Student A. The experiment will take about 15 minutes and you may earn up to $10 in 
it.  
  In the first stage of the experiment we ask Student A to make a simple 
decision between the following two options: 
 
Option 1: choose one out of the five sectors of a pie chart similar to this.  
 
 
The actual pie will be a two-sided pie, in which the two sides are identical.  
We will mark Student A’s choice on the inside of the chart. Then we will flip 
the chart randomly, and show it to you. You will not know whether (s)he observes the 
chart from the same side as you or not. You will also not see Student A’s choice. We 
will then ask you also to choose one sector out of the five. 
 Payment: Each of you will be paid $10 if you choose the same sector and nothing 
otherwise.  
 
Or, Student A may choose option 2. 
Option 2: be paid $6 for participating in the experiment 
 
If Student A chooses option 1, than your payment will depend on both your 
choices as described above. If Student A chooses option 2 then each of you will be 
paid $6.  
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
 
 Instructions for Student A 
Welcome to this experiment in decision making. Soon you will be randomly 
matched with another student. You are called Student A and the other student is 
called Student B. The experiment will take about 15 minutes and you may earn up to 
$10 in it.  
  In the first stage of the experiment you will be asked to make a simple 
decision between the following two options: 
 
Option 1: choose one out of the five sectors of a pie chart similar to this.  
 
 
The actual pie will be a two-sided pie, in which the two sides are identical.  
We will mark this choice on the inside of the chart. Then we will flip the chart 
randomly, and show it to Student B. Student B will not know whether (s)he observes 
the chart from the same side as you or not. (S)he will also not see your choice. We 
will then ask Student B also to choose one sector out of the five. 
 Payment: Each of you will be paid $10 if you choose the same sector and nothing 
otherwise.  
 
Or, you may choose option 2. 
Option 2: be paid $6 for participating in the experiment 
 
If you choose option 1, than your payment will depend on both your choices 
as described above. If you choose option 2 then each of you will be paid $6.  
In either case Student B will not know that you had a choice between options 
1 and 2. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
 Instructions for Student B 
Welcome to this experiment in decision making. Soon you will be randomly 
matched with another student. You are called Student B and the other student is called 
Student A. The experiment will take about 15 minutes and you may earn up to $10 in 
it.  
  In the first stage of the experiment we ask Student A to choose one out of the 
five sectors of a pie chart similar to this.  
 
The actual pie will be a two-sided pie, in which the two sides are identical.  
We will mark Student A’s choice on the inside of the chart. Then we will flip 
the chart randomly, and show it to you. You will not know whether (s)he observes the 
chart from the same side as you or not. You will also not see Student A’s choice. We 
will then ask you also to choose one sector out of the five. 
 
Payment: Each of you will be paid $10 if you choose the same sector and nothing 
otherwise.  
Do you have any questions? 
 